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The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."' It protects
speech that offends, impassions and angers.2 However, it does not
create an absolute free speech right.3 Certain categories of speech,
including obscenity,4 fighting words,5 libel,6 commercial speech,7 and
words likely to incite "imminent lawless action,"8 "receive limited or
no First Amendment protection." 9 Such categories represent those
restricted circumstances in which the Supreme Court has recognized a
government need to accommodate the other fundamental values, such
as the social interest in order and morality, that may at times compete
with the First Amendment interest in exposition of ideas.' °
Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.," is a case that "tests the outer
limits of [the] First Amendment,"' 2 and "has reinvigorated the dis-
* J.D., U.C. Hastings College of the Law, 1998. B.A., cum laude, Harvard
University.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.
2. See Collins v. Jordan, 102 F.3d 406, 414 (9th Cir. 1996).
3. See United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1978)(citing Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
4. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
5. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
6. See id.
7. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
9. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 841 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, 128 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1515 (1998).
10. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
11. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1515 (1998).
12. First Amendment Does Not Bar Wrongful Death Lawsuit by Victims' Survivors
Against Publisher of Hit-Man How-To Manual Used By Murderer, Federal Appellate Court
Rules; Supreme Court Denies Publisher's Request for Review, 20 No. 1 ET. L. REP. 11
(1998).
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pute"'13 over whether the First Amendment protects from civil liability
publishers of detailed instructions for violent and illegal activities.' 4
Rice balances the freedom of speech guarantee against "society's in-
terest in compensating injured parties."' 5 It also uncovers the poten-
tial for misapplication of the current "incitement" standard for
characterizing speech as unprotected because it is likely to incite "im-
minent lawless action."' 6
In Rice, the families of three murder victims brought wrongful
death and survival actions against publishing company Paladin Enter-
prises for a triple murder committed by convicted killer-James
Perry.' 7 Perry had purchased and read two of Paladin's books before
committing his triple murder,' 8 and the families claimed that by pub-
lishing the books, Hit Man: A Technical Manual for Independent Con-
tractors and How to Make a Disposable Silencer, Vol. II (hereinafter
"Hit Man Manuals"), Paladin aided and abetted Perry's murders.' 9
The families also claimed damages on civil conspiracy, strict liability
and negligence grounds.2" Paladin moved for summary judgment, ar-
guing that it had a First Amendment right to publish the Hit Man
Manuals and, therefore, could not be held liable for any civil dam-
ages.2" ' The district court granted the motion.22
The district court recognized that Paladin had "engaged in a mar-
keting strategy intended to attract and assist criminals and would-be
criminals who desire information and instructions on how to commit
crimes."'  It also agreed with the plaintiffs that "a defendant does not
enjoy absolute immunity from criminal or tort liability merely because
13. Elizabeth A. McNamara et al., A Selective Survey of Current Issues Facing Book
and Magazine Publishers, 516 PLI/PAT 9, 13 (1998).
14. Some have argued that government regulation of technical, step-by-step manuals,
like those at issue in Rice, ought to be "presumptively constitutional." See, e.g., Avital T.
Zer-Ilan, Case Note, The First Amendment and Murder Manuals: Rice v. Paladin Enter-
prises, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (D. Md. 1996), 106 YALE L.J. 2697, 2700 (1997).
15. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840.
16. Id. at 841(applying Brandenburg test).






23. Id. at 840. Moreover, upon review, the Fourth Circuit called Paladin's stipula-
tions-that "it not only knew that its instructions might be used by murderers, but that it
actually intended to provide assistance to murderers and would-be murderers..., and that
it in fact assisted Perry in particular in the commission of [three murders]"-extraordinary.
128 F.3d at 242.
he uses speech."24 It, nonetheless, maintained that the dispositive is-
sue was "whether that speech is protected by the First Amendment."'
No matter how "loathsome," the court found that the Hit Man Manu-
als "simply [did] not fall within the parameters of any of the recog-
nized exceptions to the general First Amendment principles of
freedom of speech."26 The plaintiffs, therefore, failed at the district
court level to show that "maintenance of [their] suit for damages [did]
not infringe upon the [defendant's] First Amendment protection of
speech."'27
The Fourth Circuit, however, in a "groundbreaking" ruling,2 8 re-
versed the district court's grant of summary judgment in Paladin's
favor, holding that the First Amendment does not bar "a finding that
Paladin is civilly liable as an aider and abettor of Perry's triple con-
tract murder."2 9
Rice bears resemblance to a "line of cases" in which plaintiffs sue
media defendants alleging that "media material led to physical
harm."'3° In such cases, "images in the form of movies, advertise-
ments, magazines, games, music, and television form the basis of tort
actions."'" These "media cases" fall, for the most part, into two gen-
eral categories: (1) "imitative behavior cases," in which the media
serves as a blueprint for the actor who imitates specific depicted be-
havior, and (2) "media-influenced behavior cases," in which exposure
to the media directly influences the actor's behavior.32 Besides having
to prove the elements of their tort actions, plaintiffs have to hurdle the
barrier of the First Amendment, which "bars any tort cause of action
based on constitutionally protected speech. ' 33 Plaintiffs' causes of ac-
tion will usually be "fatally flawed" if "the material sued upon is pro-
tected by the First Amendment."34
24. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844.
25. Id. (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982)).
26. Id. at 849.
27. Id.
28. Adam Cohen, Murder By The Book, TnME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 74.
29. Rice, 128 F.3d at 243.
30. Elise M. Whitaker, Note, Pornographer Liability for Physical Harms Caused by
Obscenity and Child Pornography: A Tort Analysis, 27 GA. L. Rnv. 849, 866-68 (1993)
(discussing this line of media cases as providing helpful legal precedent for pornographer
liability).
31. Id. at 867.
32. Id. at 867-68.
33. Id. at 868; see also id. at 868-900 (analyzing such barriers in terms of pornographer
liability).
34. Id. at 868-69. Furthermore, the odds will be stacked against plaintiffs in close
cases. For when the "challenged speech does not fit easily within one of these [unpro-
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Accordingly, in Rice, the First Amendment "bar[red] the imposi-
tion of civil liability on Paladin unless [the Hit Man Manuals fell]
within one of the well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech
that are unprotected by the First Amendment."35 For the district court
in Rice, "the only category of unprotected speech under which [the
Hit Man Manuals] could conceivably be placed" was incitement to
imminent, lawless activity under the rule of Brandenburg v. Ohio. 6
Indeed, "most courts apply the [Brandenburg] incitement test to alle-
gations that some form of speech caused an individual to suffer bodily
injury. 37
In Brandenburg,38 the Supreme Court "created the modem test
for the protection of speech which has a 'tendency to lead to vio-
lence."' 3 9 The Brandenburg test is typically "construed to require the
fulfillment of three elements for speech to be deemed incitement: '(1)
the speaker subjectively intended incitement; (2) in context, the words
used were likely to produce imminent lawless action; and (3) the
words used by the speaker objectively encouraged and urged incite-
ment.' '"40 Earlier Supreme Court decisions looked for "fighting
words" or advocacy creating a "clear and imminent" danger of law-
lessness, but the current Brandenburg distinction is between "mere
advocacy" and "incitement to imminent lawless action."'" Speech that
"merely advocates law violation" is protected, while speech that "in-
cites imminent lawless activity" is not.42
tected] categories, courts have been reluctant to impose limits for fear of chilling the free
exchange of ideas and the free access to information." Terri R. Day, Publications that
Incite, Solicit, or Instruct: Publisher Responsibility or Caveat Emptor?, 36 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 73 (1995).
35. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840-41 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942)).
36. Id. at 841. For purposes of its scope, this Comment accepts the Rice court's conclu-
sion that the "speech which incites imminent lawless action" category is the only category
of excepted speech into which the Hit Man Manuals could be placed.
Note that while the Brandenburg standard "has most often been applied in cases in-
volving political speech," it is "not inherently limited to political speech cases." Id. at 845-
46.
37. Note, Getting a Feminist Foot in the Courtroom Door: Media Liability for Personal
Injury Caused by Pornography, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 123, 145 (1994).
38. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
39. David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts,
and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. Rnv. 1, 4 (1994).
40. John L. Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies to
Determine Media Liability for Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler
Magazine, 10 HASTINGS CoMM. & ETr. L.J. 969, 972 (1988).
41. Day, supra note 34, at 78-79.
42. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 845 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448).
Where the Brandenburg incitement test is met, the First Amend-
ment cannot block suits seeking recovery for media induced physical
injuries "based on material falling outside the scope of its protec-
tion."'43 On the other hand, if plaintiffs cannot establish each of the
three parts of the incitement test, the First Amendment essentially
bars recovery.44
Unfortunately, in practice, the Brandenburg standard thus "pro-
vides an almost impenetrable barrier to plaintiffs seeking redress for
injuries caused by media defendants. '45 For plaintiffs attempting to
recover for injuries caused by or in reliance on "printed media" in
particular, the incitement theory "has proven untenable. ' 46 Whether
such plaintiffs rest their underlying claims on, for example, defama-
tion, invasion of privacy, negligence, breach of warranty, strict liabil-
ity, misrepresentation, or malpractice,47 "courts almost uniformly
deny relief. ' 48 Further, the Supreme Court has refrained from ruling
on "the issue of liability for injuries caused by negligently dissemi-
43. Whitaker, supra note 30, at 872.
44. But note Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975), a case which
resulted in liability with the court seemingly ignoring the First Amendment barrier and
thereby indicating the importance of context in determining whether media defendants are
held liable.
45. Diamond & Primm, supra note 40, at 972. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988)(no recovery for survi-
vors of teenager due to absence of incitement under Brandenburg in magazine article
describing autoerotic asphyxiation); Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d
1067, 1068, 1071 (Mass. 1989)(due to absence of incitement under Brandenburg, victim of
gang members' violence, imitating gang violence portrayed in film, was denied recovery,
though film was "rife with violent scenes"); McCollum v. CBS Inc., 249 Cal.Rptr. 187, 191,
193 (1988)(plaintiffs sued Ozzy Obsourne and CBS Records, Inc. after their decedent com-
mitted suicide while listening to Osbourne's song, "Suicide Solution." The court reasoned
that the lyrics did not "purport to order or command anyone to any concrete action at any
specific time, much less immediately;" it therefore found no intent to produce imminent
lawless action); Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. 1989), affd, 587 A.2d 309 (Pa.
1991)(insufficient incitement under Brandenburg in written publication); Olivia N. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982)(due to
absence of incitement under Brandenburg, nine-year-old rape victim assaulted with bottle
by teenagers who had watched a televised portrayal of rape with a plunger handle, was
denied recovery); Zamora v. C.B.S. Inc., 480 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Fla. 1979)(no incite-
ment under Brandenburg in TV programs sued upon).
46. Day, supra note 34, at 103-04.
47. See Steve Reitenour, Liability for Injuries Caused by Printed Media, 14 J. PROD.
LiAB. 71, 72-73 (1992); see, e.g., Liz Hodgson, Grisham Takes a Shot at Stone, S. CEINA
MORNING PosT, Aug. 19, 1996, at 12(after a friend was murdered by a couple who were
obsessed by the film, Natural Born Killers, author John Grisham called for the film to be
declared a defective product and its director, Oliver Stone, to be held liable for the deaths
and injuries resulting from the couple's shooting spree).
48. Day, supra note 34, at 103.
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nated printed media."4 9 Publishers have, therefore, been "relatively
safe from civil liability,"5 with courts fearful that extending tort law
to publisher liability cases will "chill[ ] First Amendment speech" and
create a "slippery slope."'"
Recognizing that "[1]egal scholars, judges, and legislators alike
have filled volumes attempting to define the scope of First Amend-
ment protections of free speech,"'52 this Comment urges a reworking
of the Brandenburg incitement test in order to prevent unexamined
rulings in favor of media defendants in violent crime instruction cases
like Rice. The district court's superficial application of Brandenburg
and hasty grant of Paladin's motion for summary judgment, in con-
trast to the Fourth Circuit's careful examination of the Hit Man
Manuals' contents and thoroughly reasoned reversal,53 reveals the
need for a more reality-based, contextual characterization of incite-
ment under Brandenburg.
Parts 1(A), II(B), and II(C) of this Comment discuss the facts of
the Rice case and specifically criticize the district court's application
of the Brandenburg incitement standard, especially in light of the
Fourth Circuit's very different approach. Part III explores the useful-
ness and feasibility of a more detailed incitement test that can mean-
ingfully account for the unique context of instruction manuals. Such
analysis, as a whole, establishes the need for a more realistic and less
rigid definition of "incitement" under Brandenburg, at least to the ex-
49. Reitenour, supra note 47, at 73-74.
50. Timothy J. Tatro, Case Note, Braun v. Soldier of Fortune: Tort Law Enters the
Braun's Age as Constitutional Safeguards for Commercial Speech Buckle 'neath the Crunch
of Third-Party Liability, 30 SAN DIEGo L. Rv. 957, 957 (1993)(criticizing an Eleventh
Circuit decision holding magazine liable for negligently publishing a gun-for-hire ad that
resulted in the death of plaintiff's father; addressing commercial speech jurisprudence; and
analyzing the detrimental effects on First Amendment freedoms of sustaining such a negli-
gence action against a publisher).
51. Day, supra note 34, at 103. There is also the argument that publishers are less
responsible, for instance, than authors. However, in Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282
(E.D. Mich. 1987), though the court recognized that publishers can be considered further
removed from liability than authors, it nonetheless stated that "publishers may have
greater responsibilities where the risk of harm is plain and severe such as a book entitled
How To Make Your Own Parachute." Lewin, 655 F. Supp. at 284. Indeed, a publisher of
instructions like those in the Hit Man Manuals, rather than the original author, could be
considered more responsible for ultimate victims of the instructions.
52. Tatro, supra note 50, at 957.
53. Judge Decries How-to Book For Murderers, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 1997, at A10
("From start to finish, [the Hit Man Manual] is an incitement. It exhorts people to take the
law into their own hands and to steel themselves to kill people.").
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tent that violent crime instruction manuals are not carelessly dis-
counted as incapable of "inciting imminent lawless action."54
H. The Hit Man Manual Case: Rice v. Paladin
Enterprises, Inc.
A. A Triple Murder
James Perry ordered and received his Hit Man Manuals in Janu-
ary of 1992 after responding to Paladin Enterprises' catalogue adver-
tisement.55 The advertisement included the following:
HIT MAN
A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors by Rex
Feral.
Rex Feral kills for hire. Some consider him a criminal.
Others think him a hero. In truth, he is a lethal weapon aimed
at those he hunts. He is a last recourse in these times when laws
are so twisted that justice goes unserved. He is a man who feels
no twinge of guilt at doing his job. He is a professional killer.
Learn how a pro gets assignments, creates a false identity,
makes a disposable silencer, leaves the scene without a trace,
watches his mark unobserved and more. Feral reveals how to
get in, do the job and get out without getting caught. For aca-
demic study only.56
Less than 5 weeks later, sometime before March 3, 1992, Perry and
Lawrence Horn of Detroit, Michigan began planning the murder of
Horn's ex-wife and son. 7 Only a year later, in Montgomery County,
Maryland-having carefully prepared his killings as instructed by Pal-
adin's Hit Man Manuals-Perry murdered Mrs. Horn, Trevor Horn
and Trevor's nurse.58
The district court found that Perry followed the Manuals' de-
tailed instructions on:
how to solicit for and obtain prospective clients in need of mur-
der for hire services; requesting up-front money for expenses;
how to register at a motel in the vicinity of the crime, paying
with cash and using a fake license tag number; committing the
murders at the victims' home; how to make the crime scene look
like a burglary; reminding to clean up and carry away the
ejected shells; breaking down the gun and discarding the pieces
along the roadside after the murders; and using a rental car, a
54. Rice, 128 F.3d at 263-65 (correcting erroneous outcome of district court decision).
55. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838-39.
56. Id. at 838.
57. See id. at 839.
58. See id.
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stolen tag on the rental car and the discarding of the tag after
the murders.5 9
Perry also used an AR-7 rifle, recommended by the Hit Man Manuals
for beginners in the trade because it is "'inexpensive and accurate...
[and] lightweight and easy to carry or conceal when disassembled."' 6 °
He used a homemade silencer, constructed according to the Manuals'
"explicit[ly] detail[ed]" directions. 61 Perry then shot each of his vic-
tims three times in the eyes from a distance of three feet.62 The Hit
Man Manuals, after all, had advised him that:
[c]lose kills are by far preferred.... You will need to know be-
yond any doubt that the desired result has been achieved. When
using a small caliber weapon . , it is best to shoot from a
distance of three to six feet. You will not want to be at point
blank range to avoid having the victim's blood splatter you or
your clothing. At least three shots should be fired to insure
quick and sure death... aim for the head-preferably the eye
sockets if you are a sharpshooter.
63
His murders accomplished, Perry disassembled the AR-7 rifle as
the Hit Man Manuals instructed, drilled out its serial number, and al-
tered the "gun barrel, the shell chamber, the loading ramp, and firing
pin and the ejector pin" with a rat-tail fle.' By taking these precau-
tions, according to the Manuals, even if Perry got "picked up or
stopped with the weapon in [his] possession, its ballistics [would] not
match the bullets [he] left behind in the mark." 65
B. The District Court: The Publisher Is Not Liable
Although the district court recognized that Perry had committed
his murders by following the steps in Paladin's Manuals, it held that
the murder victims' families could not even state a claim sufficient to
reach a jury.66 According to the Fourth Circuit, this conclusion by the
district court "must be attributed ultimately" to its failure upon its
59. Id. at 841. See also Rice, 128 F.3d at 239, 252 (Perry "in painstaking detail...
meticulously followed countless of Hit Man's 130 pages of detailed factual instructions on
how to murder and to become a professional killer"); Adam Cohen, Murder By The Book,
TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 74 ("Prosecutors showed that he followed at least 20 of its specific
instructions").
60. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 839 (quoting REx FERAL, Hrr MAN: A TECHmCAL MANUAL
FOR INDEPENDENT CoNrRAcroRs 22 (1983)).
61. Id.(citing FERAL, supra note 60, at 39).
62. See id.
63. Id. (citing FERAL, supra note 60, at 24) (emphasis added).
64. Id. (citing FERAL, supra note 60, at 25).
65. Id. at 840 (citing FERAL, supra note 60, at 105).
66. See id. at 849.
INCITEMENT BY ANY OTHER NAME
initial ruling to realize that Maryland recognizes a civil cause of action
for aiding and abetting.67 However, the dispositive issue before the
district court was "whether that speech is protected by the First
Amendment."68 Ultimately, the court found that, "considering the
context and content of the speech in Hit Man[,]... the book does not
constitute incitement to imminent lawless action."69
In making this determination, however, the district court failed to
closely analyze or define "incitement" under Brandenburg. The
court's purported query was whether the Manuals (1) were directed or
intended toward producing imminent lawless conduct and (2) were
likely to produce such imminent conduct 7° -the determination of
which, according to the court, depended upon the content and dissem-
ination context of the speech involved.7 1 However, the district court
failed to undertake any careful examination of the unique content and
context of the Hit Man Manuals.72 It disregarded the incitement dis-
cussions from other decisions, and found, under Brandenburg, First
Amendment protection for the Hit Man Manuals.7"
C. The District Court: A Cursory Look at Context and Content
To establish the Hit Man Manuals' context and content, the dis-
trict court first examined the timing of Perry's triple murder.74 It as-
serted that to have "incited or encouraged" murder, rather than to
have merely "taught" it, the defendants "must have intended that
James Perry would go out and murder Mildred Horn, Trevor Horn,
and Janice Saunders immediately."'75 The court found, however, that
"James Perry committed these atrocious murders a year after receiv-
ing the books" and that nothing in the Hit Man Manuals "could be
characterized as a command to immediately murder the three
victims.
76
67. Rice, 128 F.3d at 250.
68. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844 (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
915 (1982)).
69. IL at 848.
70. See id. at 846-47 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)).
71. See id. at 845. See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66
(1976) (determination depends upon "exactly what the speaker had to say" and "the set-
ting in which the speech occurs"); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915-
16 n.50 (1982) (determination depends upon "the statements in issue and the circum-
stances under which they were made").
72. See Rice, 940 F. Supp at 845.
73. See id. at 843.
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The district court's requirement that Perry have murdered his vic-
tims "immediately" is unsatisfactory. First, as the court itself noted,
books "take time to read." Second, the Hit Man Manuals outline the
process for completing a successful murder from start to finish.77
They explain how to prepare both mentally and physically, acquire
equipment, solicit business, make a plan, set up surveillance, etc.
Within the short time of one year, Perry managed to read the book,
follow the Manuals' instructions, travel across the country, locate his
victims, and murder three people.78
The district court's distinction between imminent and not-so-im-
minent lawless activity would suggest that long, complex crimes, in-
volving numerous people in different parts of the country, cannot be
deemed imminent lawless activity. Imminent lawless activity started
when Perry began following the Manuals' instructions for soliciting
business and formulating the murder plan.79
Next, the Rice court examined the chapter titles of the Hit Man
Manuals, including:
Chapter One: The Beginning-Mental and Physical Preparation
Chapter Two: Equipment-Selection and Purpose
Chapter Three: The Disposable Silencer-A Poor Man's Access to a
Rich Man's Toy
Chapter Five: Homework and Surveillance-Mapping a Plan and
Checking It for Accuracy
Chapter Six: Opportunity Knocks-Finding Employment, What
to Charge, What to Avoid
Chapter Nine: Legally Illegal-Enjoying the Fruits.80
The court interpreted these titles to characterize the Manuals' instruc-
tive, rather than inciting, nature. It further cited Paladin's catalogue
disclaimer, "for academic study only," and the Manuals' own dis-
77. See, e.g., infra discussion regarding chapter titles.
78. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847.
79. Compare Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, How Imminent is Imminent?: The Imminent
Danger Test Applied to Murder Manuals, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 47, 67 (1997) (plan-
ning may begin immediately, and planning a murder is a criminal act itself).
80. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 847 n.4.
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claimer,8 ' "[f]or information purposes only," as evidence of the Manu-
als' instructive nature.'
The conclusion, however, that instruction manuals are instructive
rather than inciting in nature, simply begs the incitement question.
Furthermore, the Manuals' disclaimers lend little to any incitement
analysis, especially considering the "deadly information" 3 which the
Manuals contain. The phrases "for informational purposes only" and
"for academic study only" do not remotely warn that, for example,
"the instructions herein, unlike other instructions, are not to be fol-
lowed" or even that "murder is a crime." Additionally, any "hit man,"
reading the Hit Man Manuals for pointers, would be using them for
informational purposes, and therefore, would undoubtedly study the
Hit Man Manuals in an academic manner, perhaps memorizing help-
ful tips, comparing Feral's techniques with his or her own, or noting
the changing trends in hit man culture.
Finally, the district court in Rice found it significant that the
"deadly information" used by Perry "is contained in books," which
"take time to read," "are available to an unlimited number of people,"
and, thus, "at worst.., amount to nothing more than advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time."84 The court noted, in
particular, "that out of the 13,000 copies of [the Hit Man Manuals]
that have been sold nationally, one person actually used the informa-
tion over the ten years that the book has been in circulation."8 5 This,
for the court, demonstrated that the Hit Man Manuals did not have "a
tendency to incite violence."86
The court's conclusion that the information "contained in
books ... at worst," advocates illegal action at some future time. This
argument shows the court's failure to examine "incitement" under the
Brandenburg standard when applied specifically to the context and
content of violent crime instruction manuals. The availability of such
information in book form, to an unlimited number of people, may be
81. Id. at 838-39.
WARNING
IT IS AGAINST THE LAW TO manufacture a silencer without an appropri-
ate license from the federal government. There are state and local law prohibit-
ing the possession of weapons and their accessories in many areas. Severe
penalties are prescribed for violations of these laws. Neither the author nor the
publisher assumes responsibility for the use or misuse of information contained in
this book. For informational purposes only! Id.
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especially "inciting." In turn, it points to the publisher's increased re-
sponsibility for third party criminal acts simply because the act of pub-
lication inevitably broadens the potential audience.87 Further, the
district court's reliance upon the apparent fact that only one person in
ten years had actually used the Hit Man is unpersuasive and illogical.
The Hit Man Manuals explicitly explain how to be a successful mur-
derer by providing detailed instructions for many steps of committing
the crime, including, covering one's tracks and "enjoying the fruits."
Perry may simply be the one person in ten years who got caught using
his easy-to-follow, step-by-step guide to murder.88
In sharp contrast to the district court's approach, the Fourth Cir-
cuit actually examined Hit Man itself. It "carefully and repeatedly
read[ ] Hit Man in its entirety" before issuing its opinion.89 It then set
forth lengthy excerpts from the Hit Man Manuals and a "chapter-by-
chapter synopsis" rather than merely brush over chapter titles and
warning. 9° The Fourth Circuit considered not only the Hit Man
Manuals' numerous and graphic details about how to commit murder,
but the Hit Man Manuals' attitude, voice, and targeted audience as
well.9 1
The Fourth Circuit noted, for example, that Hit Man encourages
its readers through "powerful prose in the second person and impera-
tive voice," reassuring readers that "they may proceed with their plans
without fear of either personal failure or punishment."'92 It speaks
"directly to the reader.., like a parent to a child" and "addresses
87. Rice, 128 F.3d at 248. The Fourth Circuit made a similar point with respect to
Paladin's admittedly intentional aid to would-be murderers: "where a speaker-individual
or media-acts with the purpose of assisting in the commission of crime, we do not believe
that the First Amendment insulates that speaker from responsibility for his actions simply
because he may have disseminated his message to a wide audience." Id.
88. Compare Radwan, supra note 79, at 71-72 ("it is impossible to know if other
murders might have been accomplished with these types of manuals that have never been
traced to such publications. The courts should focus on the speech itself, rather than the
results to date") (citations omitted).
89. Rice, 128 F.3d at 254.
90. Id. at 256-62.
91. See id. at 236 (excerpting from the Hit Man Manuals). The Manuals provide the
following representative tip for would-be murderers:
[If you decide to kill your victim with a knife,] ... [m]ake your thrusts to a vital
organ and twist the knife before you withdraw it. If you hit bone, you will have to
file the blade to remove the marks left on the metal when it struck the victim's
bone.... Using your six inch, serrated blade knife, stab deeply into the side of
the victim's neck and push the knife forward in a forceful movement. This
method will half decapitate the victim, cutting both his main arteries and wind
pipe, ensuring immediate death.
92. Id. at 252.
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itself to every potential obstacle to murder, removing each, seriatim,
until nothing appears to the reader to stand between him and his exe-
cution of the ultimate criminal act."'93 Indeed, "at every point where
the would-be murderer might yield either to reason or to reservations,
Hit Man emboldens the killer, confirming not only that he should pro-
ceed but that he must proceed, if he is to establish his manhood."94
After a thorough review of Hit Man-of the actual speech at is-
sue-the Fourth Circuit arrived at a conclusion directly contrary to
the district court's opinion. According to the Fourth Circuit, "there is
not even a hint that the aid was provided [to Perry] in the form of
speech that might constitute abstract advocacy."95 Rather, Hit Man
"overtly promotes murder in concrete, non-abstract terms," and
"[a]ny argument that Hit Man is abstract advocacy entitling the book,
and therefore Paladin, to heightened First Amendment protection
under Brandenburg is, on its face, untenable." 96
D. The District Court: A Cursory Look at Relevant Authority
Several circuit court decisions reveal the district court's analysis
as totally inadequate in finding insufficient incitement to pierce Pala-
din's immunity. For example, the Rice plaintiffs offered United States
v. Barnett97 and United States v. Buttorffl8 "for the proposition that
criminal or tort liability may not be avoided merely because the
wrongdoer uses speech to accomplish his illicit purpose."9 9 The dis-
trict court, however, distinguished both cases with irrelevant reasons.
In Barnett, publishers were charged with aiding and abetting
crime through publication and distribution of instructions for making
illegal drugs."° The Rice plaintiffs pointed to the factual parallels be-
tween Barnett and their case in that
1) defendants in both cases published and advertised step-by-
step instructions on how to commit crimes; 2) defendants in
both cases mailed an instruction manual to an unknown person
who responded to the advertisement; and 3) perpetrators in
both cases followed the step-by-step instructions to commit the
crimes.' 0 '
93. Id. at 261.
94. Id. at 252.
95. Id. at 249.
96. Id. at 254-55.
97. 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
98. 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978).
99. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 842.
100. Barnett, 667 F.2d at 837.
101. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 843.
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The Barnett court had concluded that:
To the extent.., that [the publisher] Barnett appears to contend
that he is immune from search or prosecution because he uses
the printed word in encouraging and counseling others in the
commission of a crime, we hold expressly that the [F]irst
[A]mendment does not provide a defense as a matter of law to
such conduct.10 2
The district court in Rice, however, cursorily distinguished Barnett as
"a criminal case where the defendant publisher was charged with
criminal aiding and abetting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 2.''1°3 It
neither examined why Barnett's First Amendment defense failed nor
why his PCP manufacturing manual was thus deemed unprotected
speech under Brandenburg.
In Buttorff, the defendants were convicted "on various counts of
aiding and abetting several persons in the filing of false or fraudulent
income tax forms."'0 4 The defendants' "only participation in the al-
legedly illegal activity... was to talk about [their] ideas before gather-
ings of disgruntled Americans." ''"5 The aided individuals testified,
nonetheless, that they had submitted the fraudulent tax forms "be-
cause of the defendants' recommendations, advice or suggestions."'1 6
For instance, because the defendants had stated that "30 or 40 claimed
allowances would be sufficient to stop withholding,"'0 7 several indi-
viduals claimed between 28 and 40 allowances.0 8
When the defendants contended that their First Amendment
right of freedom of speech prohibited their convictions, the Buttorff
court responded by quoting Judge Learned Hand:
One may not counsel or advise others to violate the law as it
stands. Words are not only the keys of persuasion, but the trig-
gers of action, and those which have no purport but to counsel
the violation of law cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a
part of that public opinion which is the final source of govern-
ment in a democratic state.... To counsel or advise a man to act
is to urge upon him either that it is his interest or his duty to do
it.... If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their
duty or their interest to resist the law, it seems to me one should
not be held to have attempted to cause its violation. 0 9
102. Barnett, 667 F.2d at 843.
103. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 843.
104. Buttorff, 572 F.2d at 621.
105. Id. at 623.
106. Id. at 622.
107. Id. at 623.
108. See icL
109. Id. at 624 (quoting Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
As for the Supreme Court's Brandenburg distinction between pro-
tected speech, which merely advocates law violation, and unprotected
speech, which incites imminent lawless activity, the Buttorff court
stated that:
[a]lIthough the speeches here do not incite the type of imminent
lawless activity referred to in criminal syndicalism cases, the de-
fendants did go beyond mere advocacy of tax reform. They ex-
plained how to avoid withholding and their speeches and
explanations incited several individuals to activity that violated
federal law. 10
Thus, the defendants' speech was not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection because it went beyond mere advocacy of tax reform.
It explained how to avoid withholding by "counseling the principals in
the technique of evasion of income taxes.""'
The Buttorff court further found that the defendants' speech "was
sufficient action to constitute aiding and abetting the filing of false or
fraudulent withholding forms.""' 2 It affirmed the defendants' convic-
tions, even absent any proof that the defendants had "profited from
the filing of false tax returns by others, or had any knowledge of the
fact that such returns had been in fact filed." 113
As with Barnett, the district court in Rice noted Buttorffs factual
similarities to the Hit Man Manuals case before it, but concluded sim-
ply that the plaintiffs had "cited no authority that would allow the
Court to apply the holdings in these criminal cases to the facts of the
instant case."
114
The Eighth and Ninth Circuit's analyses in Buttorf and Barnett,"5
respectively, formed the foundation for the Rice plaintiffs' argument:
the First Amendment is not a defense to either tort or criminal liabil-
ity where defendants' instructions were deemed speech which incited
imminent lawless action." 6 The Rice district court thus completely
110. Id. (reasoning followed in United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569,571 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Moss, 559 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Or. 1983)).
111. Id. at 628.
112. Id. at 624.
113. United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 843 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Buttorff to reject
defendant's contention that "he is immune from search or prosecution because he uses the
printed word in encouraging and counseling others in the commission of a crime" and to
hold that "the [Fjirst [A]mendment does not provide a defense as a matter of law to such
conduct").
114. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 843 (D. Md. 1996), rev'd, 128 F.3d
233 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1515 (1998).
115. See discussion Part II(C).
116. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 842-43.
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failed to consider problematic contrary authority in reaching its own
resolution of the Brandenburg incitement question.
The court likewise overlooked the significance of Weirum v. RKO
General Inc. ,117 which the plaintiffs relied on "for the proposition that
defendants can be held liable for physical injury caused by their
words."1 '8 In Weirum, the plaintiff's decedent was killed when a lis-
tener of the defendant radio station negligently forced the decedent's
car off the highway while responding to a station contest which re-
warded the first listener to locate its peripatetic disc jockey.119
The Weirum court found for the plaintiff, stating that "[t]he First
Amendment does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely
because achieved by word rather than act."' 2 ° The issue, for the
Weirum court, was whether there is "civil accountability for foresee-
able results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of harm to the
decedent."' 2 '
The district court in Rice distinguished Weirum because the
Weirum defendant's broadcasts had repeatedly encouraged listeners
to act in an inherently dangerous manner. 22 According to the district
court, "[n]o such urging occurred in [Rice].' 23
By distinguishing Weirum, the district court in Rice disregarded
its importance in attacking Paladin's First Amendment defense and to
the issue of social accountability. It ignored the fact that the actions
which the Weirum defendant "urged" were not even "lawless." Fur-
thermore, it ignored the noticeably cursory nature of the Weirum
court's reference to the First Amendment. Apparently, the Weirum
court did not think it even had to analyze any First Amendment ques-
tion before finding liability in a media negligence case.' 24 In stark
contrast, the First Amendment served as a virtual bar to recovery
under the district court's reasoning in Rice.
Some courts have, in fact, taken the approach of deciding media
negligence liability one way or the other without ever exploring the
First Amendment issue.'2 Some courts pay, at most, "superficial
117. 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
118. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844.
119. See Weirum, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 469-71.
120. Id. at 472.
121. Id-
122. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844.
123. Id.
124. See Weirum, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471-72.
125. See Reitenour, supra note 47, at 74-75 (comparing the courts' differing approaches
to the negligence issue in Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1325
(M.D. Ala. 1991), Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D.
Summer 19981 ICTMN YAYOHRNM
homage to the First Amendment" when finding a media defendant
liable for negligence. 126 There is a perceived divide in which courts
emphasizing negligence tend to find liability while courts emphasizing
the First Amendment tend not to.'2 7 Again, Weirum thus does pro-
vide support for the proposition for which plaintiff's offered it: that
media defendants can be held liable for physical injury caused by
words alone, perhaps even without the First Amendment presenting a
significant factor for judicial consideration." The district court in
Rice should not have neglected this proposition.
Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit gave serious consid-
eration in its Rice decision and in several of its prior decisions to judi-
cial language indicating that the First Amendment does not
necessarily bar liability for aiding and abetting a crime through
speech.'29 For example, it cited to Buttorff, not only in Rice, but also
in United States v. Fleschner3 ° and United States v. Kelley.' As in
Buttorff, the defendants in Fleschner and Kelley instructed groups of
people in filing false income tax forms. 32 The people heeded their
advice and false forms were filed i  Although the defendants were
somewhat more involved in the ultimate fraudulent filings than were
the defendants in Buttorff,3 the Fourth Circuit's incitement analysis
Ark. 1987), and Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 880 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990)).
126. Id. at 74.
127. See id. at 74-77.
128. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844.
129. In its Rice decision, the Fourth Circuit discussed both Buttorff, 128 F.3d at 245, and
Barnett, 128 F.3d at 244-45, which it deemed "indistinguishable in principle" from the Rice
case. The Fourth Circuit noted further that:
every court that has addressed the issue ... has held that the First Amendment
does not necessarily pose a bar to liability for aiding and abetting a crime, even
when such aiding and abetting takes the form of the spoken or written word.
128 F.3d at 244 (emphasis added).
130. 98 F.3d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 1996). The Fourth Circuit refers back to Fleschner in its
Rice decision. See Rice 128 F.3d at 246.
131. 769 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit refers back to Kelley in its Rice
decision. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 245.
132. See Fleschner, 98 F.3d at 159.
133. See id. (citing Kelley, 769 F.2d at 217).
134. For example, in addition to instructions and advice on claiming unlawful exemp-
tions, not filing tax returns and not paying tax on wages, evidence showed that the purpose
of defendants' meetings in Fleschner "was to encourage people to unlawful actions by con-
vincing them that it was legal to claim false exemptions, to hide income." Fleschner, 98
F.3d at 159. In Kelley, the defendant had organized a group called the Constitutional Tax
Association and had solicited dues paying members. See Kelley, 769 F.2d at 216. Besides
explaining how to avoid income tax withholdings and providing detailed instructions for
preparation of W4 and other forms, defendant provided forms for members' use and a
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in Fleschner and Kelley indicates that Buttorff was not an aberration
and that the district court in Rice rushed to its Brandenburg judgment.
In Fleschner, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States of income tax revenue.3 The court con-
cluded that the evidence did not support the defendants' First
Amendment defense.'36 Such a defense, according to the court, "is
warranted if there is evidence that the speaker's purpose or words are
mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety of opposition to the in-
come tax law.' 1 37 Defendants' speech, however, was "not remote
from the commission of the criminal acts.' 1 38 It did not consist of
mere "theoretical discussion of noncompliance with law.' 39
In Kelley, the Fourth Circuit rejected Kelley's contention that he
did not assist, but only gave advice which his listeners "were free to
accept or reject"'4 ° and upheld his conviction for conspiring to de-
fraud the federal government and for aiding and assisting in prepara-
tion of false tax forms.' 4 ' Such a contention, according to the court,
"ignore[d] reality.' 42 Kelley's participation in completing the false
tax forms was "as real" as if he took pen to hand and filled them out
himself.143 "His was no abstract criticism of income tax laws."'" He
did more than abstractly teach. He actively assisted in the crime. 145
"The claim of First Amendment protection of his speech [was there-
fore] frivolous.' 46
Another example of language cited for support by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Rice, which undercuts the district court's Brandenburg analysis
is found in United States v. Mendelsohn.47 There, the defendants were
convicted for aiding and abetting interstate transportation of wagering
paraphernalia. 48 They mailed a computer disk containing a book-
purported legal brief arguing that wages were not subject to income taxation. See id. Kel-
ley also told members that if they "followed his advice he would keep them out of
trouble." Id.
135. See Fleschner, 98 F.3d at 157.
136. See id. at 158.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 159 (quoting Kelley, 769 F.2d at 217).
140. Kelley, 769 F.2d at 217.
141. See id. at 216.





147. 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1990).
148. See id. at 1184.
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making program called SOAP from Nevada to California.14 9 They
knew that most customers used SOAP for illegal bookmaking, but
also sold it to bettors and tried to sell it to game companies and legal
sports bookmakers. 50 The defendants analogized SOAP to a com-
puter instruction manual and argued that it was speech protected by
the First Amendment.' 5' They proposed a jury instruction tracking the
Brandenburg test. 52 The Mendelsohn court, however, affirmed the
defendants' convictions, noting that the defendants had "furnished
computerized directions for functional use in an illegal activity" and
"knew that SOAP was to be used as an integral part of a bookmaker's
illegal activity."' 53 The court stated, "[w]here speech becomes an in-
tegral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is foreclosed even
if the prosecution rests on words alone."' 54 It deemed SOAP "too
instrumental in and intertwined with the performance of criminal ac-
tivity to retain [F]irst [A]mendment protection.' ' 55
The Hit Man Manuals were likewise instrumental and inter-
twined with Perry's triple murder, thereby foreclosing a First Amend-
ment Brandenburg defense under the Mendelsohn reasoning. The
district court, however, once again did not account for such contrary
authority or address this important aspect of context in its incitement
discussion.
The district court's sparse analysis was a weak basis for its finding
of insufficient incitement under Brandenburg not only in light of the
language in the above decisions, but also in light of the fact that the
United States Supreme Court Justices themselves differ in their char-
acterizations of incitement. In Hess v. Indiana, for example, Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting, wrote: "[s]urely the sentence, 'We'll take the
fucking street later.. .' is susceptible of characterization as an exhorta-
tion, particularly when uttered in a loud voice while facing a
crowd."' 56 The Hess Court deemed this remark not punishable as in-
citement of illegal activity under Brandenburg.57 There was, accord-
ing to the Court, no rational inference from the import of the
149. See id.
150. See iL
151. See id. at 1185.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 1186.
156. 414 U.S. 105, 111 (1973)(emphasis added).
157. See id. at 108-09.
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language that Hess's words were intended to produce and likely to
produce imminent lawless action.158
Apparently, however, such inference existed in the mind of Jus-
tice Rehnquist, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
joined in dissent.' 59 Clearly, incitement is not easily characterized.
Indeed, it is susceptible to differing characterizations depending upon
which aspects of the challenged speech's context are taken into ac-
count. Rehnquist, for example, particularly focused upon the volume
and direction of the words at issue, rather than upon the fact that they
urged action at some "later" time. 6 Thus, differing emphases upon
the many contextual aspects of speech can justify a finding of incite-
ment or not.
Finally, the very language upon which the Brandenburg Court re-
lied to set forth its distinction between "speech which advocates" and
"speech which incites" indicates that a broader understanding of "in-
citement," than that afforded by the district court in Rice, was impli-
cated. The Brandenburg Court stated that "the mere abstract
teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a re-
sort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action."'' According to this dis-
tinguishing language, unprotected incitement consists of "preparing
for" and "steeling to" imminent lawless action. Protected advocacy,
by contrast, is "abstract" teaching. The Hit Man Manuals are
designed to prepare the reader for committing and getting away with
murder.'62 They do so with details which can hardly be described as
"abstract"'163 and with tips and assurances intended to steel the reader
158. See id. at 109.
159. See id. at 111.
160. Id. at 110-11.
161. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969)(quoting Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
162. Hit Man states: "[s]tep by step you will be taken from research to equipment selec-
tion to job preparation to successful job completion. You will learn where to find employ-
ment, how much to charge, and what you can, and cannot, do with the money you earn."
Rice, 128 F.3d at 236 (excerpting passages from Hit Man).
163. Hit Man describes various means of disposing of victims' corpses after successful
hits, including the following:
If you choose to sink the corpse, you must first make several deep stabs into the
body's lungs (from just under the rib cage) and belly. This is necessary because
gases released during decomposition will bloat these organs, causing the body to
rise to the surface of the water.
Id. at 238 (excerpting passages from Hit Man).
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physically and mentally." Thus, not only did the district court in Rice
ignore its own and other Circuits' decisions, but it refused to honestly
apply the teaching of Brandenburg itself.
The Fourth Circuit again attributed the district court's failure to
seriously consider the plaintiffs' offered authority to the district
court's doubts about Maryland aiding and abetting law.' 65 However,
the Fourth Circuit, in turn, noted that the district court's doubts were
"almost certainly eased" by its alternative conclusion that the Hit Man
Manuals are a mere instructional manual for murder and not incite-
ment in any event.' 66 Thus, underlying the district court's failure to
account for contrary authority was its Brandenburg incitement deter-
mination. And underlying this determination was a superficial Bran-
denburg incitement analysis which addressed only cursorily the
content and context of the Hit Man Manuals. At bottom, if unexam-
ined rulings in favor of media defendants are to be avoided, then the
Brandenburg standard must be reworked.
I. The Necessity for and Feasibility of a More
Encompassing Brandenburg Standard
A. Legal Scholars Suggest a Change
Various legal scholars agree that a broader understanding of in-
citement was originally intended. Professor Lawrence Tribe of
Harvard Law School has suggested that the Brandenburg test com-
bines the best of two prior views: the incitement test (set out by Judge
Learned Hand) and the clear and present danger test (reflecting Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis' concern with likely harm). 67 The clear
and present danger test was essentially a balancing test in which courts
weighed the free speech interest at issue against the seriousness of the
164. Hit Man recognizes for its reader that "[a]lmost every man harbors a fantasy of
living the life of Mack Bolan or some other fictional hero who kills for fun and profit ....
But few have the courage or knowledge to make that dream a reality." Rice, 128 F.3d at
236 (excerpting passages from Hit Man). It explains that: "the professional hit man fills a
need in society and is, at times, the only alternative for "personal" justice. Moreover, if my
advice and the proven methods in this book are followed, certainly no one will ever know."
Id. (excerpting passages from Hit Man).
Finally, after taking its reader through its detailed, step-by-step formula for murder,
Hit Man congratulates the reader: "You are a man. Without a doubt, you have proved it.
You have come face to face with death and emerged the victor through cunning and exper-
tise. You have dealt death as a professional." Id. at 239 (excerpting passages from Hit
Man).
165. See id. at 250.
166. Id.
167. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONsTrrTTIoNAL LAW 581, 616 (1978).
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regulated danger, rather than its imminence or lawlessness. 168 This
focus on "seriousness," along with Hand's assertion that to "advise a
man to act is to urge upon him either that it is his interest or duty to
act to do it,"' 69 could make for broad and highly contextual findings of
"incitement." Indeed, the fact that "inciting" speech is already sus-
ceptible to characterizations which vary, depending upon the aspects
of the speech's context that a court takes into account, indicates that
such increasingly contextual findings would better reflect reality.
Professor David Crump of the University of Houston Law School
advocates a more contextual, reality-based incitement analysis. He
describes a phenomenon which he calls "camouflaged incitement,"
and writes that:
in spite of the deference that we grant to speech falling short of
actual incitement to crime, and in spite of our recognition that
there are prohibited utterances that cross the line, a borderland
remains in which clever speakers can hide, with form, the sub-
stance of what they say."'
This phenomenon of "difficult-to-recognize incitement," according to
Crump, deserves more attention than it has received.' 7 '
Among the forms of "camouflaged incitement" which Crump
identifies are the "recipe cases" where published depictions are so
specific that they go beyond mere description.1 72 Such cases supply
"otherwise missing information needed to commit a crime;" couple
"description with details that amount to instructions;" or provide "a
detailed road map for violence."' 73 Another form of camouflaged in-
citement is found in cases involving "advocacy by attractive presenta-
tion. 1 74 Such advocacy utilizes "'glowing' treatment of forbidden
acts," often combined with "appeals to heroes or ideals."' 75 Given
such rhetorical devices, it can be difficult to distinguish between "cam-
ouflaged incitement to crime" and "advocacy of ideas.' 76 Hence,
more than a superficial analysis is required.
168. See Diamond & Primm, supra note 40, at 975.
169. See discussion supra Part II(C).
170. Crump, supra note 39, at 1-2 (examining how the law should protect both the free-
dom of speech and the safety of victims of camouflaged incitement, and concluding that the
solution lies within the Brandenburg test itself, id. at 6).
171. Id. at 2 n.3.
172. Id. at 33-34.
173. Id. at 33-37.
174. Id. at 39.
175. Id. at 40.
176. Id. at 41.
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Crump proposes a case-by-case approach which "considers multi-
ple evidentiary factors" in order to "best distinguish[ ] incitement
from protected expression" in "close[ ] situations. '117 7 The "eviden-
tiary factors' 1 78 include: the express utterance; pattern of the utter-
ance; the context, including medium, audience, surrounding
communications; predictability and anticipated seriousness of unlaw-
ful results, and whether they occur; the extent of speaker's knowledge
or reckless disregard of the likelihood of violent results; the availabil-
ity of other means of expressing a similar message; the inclusion of
disclaimers; and whether speech is on a matter of public concern.'7 9
Crump makes this proposal because the Brandenburg standard, under
which speech is either unprotected incitement or protected expres-
sion, "begs the question in close cases" where the distinction is less
than clear.'8 0
The district court's decision in Rice was an excellent example of
judicial question-begging: instruction manuals are instructive, there-
fore not inciting, and therefore not incitement under Brandenburg.
Crump's approach would at least force a detailed, multi-factored con-
sideration of the context and content of the speech at issue- a consid-
eration which the district court itself deemed the proper basis for a
Brandenburg incitement determination and which the Fourth Circuit
subsequently undertook.' 8 1 Crump's approach would, he claims,
"identify serious cases of camouflaged incitement to violence and
murder, and yet ... protect ... freedom of speech as fully as the
Supreme Court has protected it in contexts of less serious risk."' 8 2
Professor John L. Diamond of Hastings College of the Law and
James L. Primm of Latham & Watkins in Washington, D.C. also criti-
cize judicial application of the Brandenburg standard, calling for
courts to take a more reality-based approach toward media defend-
ants.' 3 According to Diamond and Primm, "[c]ourts have inappro-
priately denied liability by failing to differentiate among kinds of
media liability cases and by failing to analyze them as they would
other similar tort cases."'184
177. Id. at 45.
178. Id. at 52.
179. See id. at 54-69.
180. Id. at at 45.
181. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 233.
182. Id. at 79-80.
183. See generally Diamond & Primm, supra note 40.
184. Id. at 970.
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Interestingly enough, this may have been precisely the district
court's failure in Rice. The court compared the Perry murders to a
variety of unsuccessful cases in which "violent movies or television
programs... were alleged to have caused physical injury or death."'18 5
The district court saw "no difference" between these cases and the
case before it18 6 and simply followed the respective findings of insuffi-
cient 'incitement' under Brandenburg.87 The movies and programs at
issue, however, did not have the how-to format of the Hit Man Manu-
als and "were considered depictions of violence alleged to have been
imitated."' 8 This significant contextual difference between the Hit
Man Manuals and the imitated movies and programs thus went unex-
amined at the district court level in Rice.
Diamond and Primm further suggest that "some cases involving
physical injuries caused by media defendants should be classified into
traditional tort typologies," rather than subjected routinely to the
Brandenburg incitement standard.'89 For example, in "erroneous in-
struction cases outside of the media context," courts have imposed
manufacturer liability for errors in product instructions or in naviga-
tional chart instructions. 190 Likewise, non-media defendants are sub-
ject to liability for negligence when sponsoring or promoting
activities. 19' Media instructions and media-sponsored activities, ac-
cording to Diamond and Primm, can similarly and properly be "sub-
jected to liability under negligence theory because there is an intent to
elicit action."'192 On the other hand, "speech which stimulates individ-
uals to act aggressively and bring harm to themselves and others is
regulable only to the extent that it tends to incite or to the extent the
speech otherwise falls out of the purview of the first amendment." 93
Thus, Diamond and Primm's discussion indicates that the district
court was wrong when it failed to see any difference between its vio-
lent crime instruction case and imitative violence cases, not only be-
cause it ignored contextual differences which could impact its
incitement determination, but also because those same contextual dif-




189. Diamond & Primm, supra note 40, at 972.
190. Id. at 976.
191. See id. at 984.
192. Id. at 996.
193. Id.
ferences might take an instruction case like Rice out of the First
Amendment Brandenburg arena altogether.
B. Incitement Determinations in the Unique Context of Instruction
Manual Cases
Indeed, violent crime instruction cases particularly exemplify the
need for a contextual application of the Brandenburg standard be-
cause, whatever the outcome, it is simply not accurate to presume
without careful analysis that so-called media speech is incapable of
inciting imminent lawless activity. In Rice, the district court recog-
nized the Hit Man Manual case as a "novel" one, 194 suggesting that
the context was important. The district court recognized that the
question of whether there exists a "substantial connection or causal
nexus" between publications like the Hit Man Manuals and "the ulti-
mate acts of criminal defendants," which are necessary to support civil
liability against the publishing company, remains undetermined.'95 It,
nevertheless, applied a rigid, superficial, predisposed version of the
Brandenburg incitement standard, which allowed the plaintiffs' case to
fall, albeit temporarily, before the barrier of the First Amendment,
and never reached the issue of whether a causal nexus existed. 96
Where the families of murder victims seek justice, as in Rice, this
issue of causal nexus is worthy of at least some judicial consideration.
Violent media-entertainment can promote criminal violence through
simple imitation alone.' 97 Fictional treatments of crime not only teach
crime techniques to be imitated, but can "inspire and empower poten-
tial criminals" as well.198 Even media reports of actual crimes can
promote violence through simple imitation. The "phenomenon of
194. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See Symposium, Massaging the Medium: Analyzing and Responding to Media Vio-
lence Without Harming the First Amendment, 4-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17, 17 (1995)
("Two surveys of young American male violent felons found that 22-34% had imitated
crime techniques they watched on television programs.").
198. Id. For example:
John Hinckley drew encouragement in his attempt to shoot President Reagan
from the dozens of times he watched Taxi Driver, a movie about an assassin who
stalks a presidential candidate and wins a young woman's affection. The man
who murdered twenty-two people in Luby's Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas, in Octo-
ber 1991 was found with a ticket to the film The Fisher King in his pocket; the film
depicts a mass murder in a restaurant. In January 1993 in Grayson, Kentucky,
seventeen-year-old Scott Pennington fatally shot a teacher and a janitor and held
a classroom of students hostage; he had recently written a book report on a Ste-
phen King novel in which a student shoots a teacher and holds a class hostage.
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copycat crimes that follow truthful and accurate-but titillating-
newspaper accounts of an unusual murder" is widely recognized.1 99 In
short, "[p]ure unadorned description or depiction, accompanied by no
solicitation at all, can sometimes induce action. '' 2 ° "Graphic and eas-
ily imitated depictions of violence" thus present a special danger of
being imitated.210 Indeed, "[a]s studies regarding the social impact of
graphic violence share more decisive results, the courts may come to
recognize that publications which contain such violence deserve less
First Amendment protection."2 "2
Certainly, a First Amendment standard must have the goal of
protecting the public but also of allowing information to flow freely.
An incitement test that would allow suppression of the evening news,
for instance, would go too far. At this point, therefore, "[t]he danger
of copycats, by itself, obviously does not justify suppression of descrip-
tions of crime. ' 20 3 To the contrary, certain depictions of violence can
be viewed as serving the First Amendment's core values, despite the
"danger that they may furnish ideas to impressionable people."20 4
Accordingly, "description-copycat cases uniformly have resulted in
holdings of no liability., 20 5 Courts are unwilling to suppress accounts
of actual events even if the information leads to harm.
Instruction, however, goes beyond simple imitation or depiction.
It even goes beyond the type of depiction which Crump calls a "rec-
ipe" for violence, or "camouflaged incitement," because it is
"amount[ing] to implicit advocacy of violence or injury, as clearly as
express incitement might. '2 6 Instructions not only serve as blueprints
or recipes for action, but also imply that they should be followed, that
they are safe to follow, legal to follow, and so on. Instructions are
199. Crump, supra note 39, at 28. For example, car-jacking spread rapidly across the
country after a car-jacking incident in Detroit was publicized. See Symposium, supra note
198, at 20. Similarly, a man in Los Angeles dropped concrete from an overpass, blinding a
driver below, several days after local papers had widely publicized an incident in which a
man dropped concrete from an overpass onto traffic below. See id. at 20.
200. Crump, supra note 39, at 26.
201. Id. (citing as an example, Hous. CHRON., June 12, 1987, at A21 (reporting that two
teen-age cousins had set fire to a prize-winning dog after seeing, as the cousins described it,
a movie in which an individual was setting dogs and cats on fire)).
202. Day, supra note 34, at 103-04.
203. Crump, supra note 39, at 28.
204. Id. at 30.
205. Id. at 28 n.148.
206. Id. at 33.
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thus much more facilitating, inspiring, empowering, and "steeling for
action" than any sort of depiction.2"7
Instruction cases such as Rice, therefore, receive inadequate anal-
ysis if their differences from simple imitation cases go completely
unexplored. For Diamond and Primm, cases involving "media depic-
tions which are imitated by the audience member without any mani-
festations of intent on the part of the media to elicit such
imitations . . . clearly fall outside of directions and instructions
cases. '20 8 The district court in Rice, however, deemed such cases "no
different" from the case before it, even though Paladin could not con-
tend that James Perry literally misused the Hit Man Manuals' informa-
tion.20 9 To the contrary, Paladin's marketing strategy was designed
precisely for the purpose of attracting and assisting criminals like
Perry.2
10
Steve Reitenour mentions an illustrative incident involving First
Love: A Young People's Guide to Sexual Information, written by Dr.
Ruth Westheimer and Dr. Nathan Kravetz.21' The incident serves to
exhibit our common understanding of instructions as distinguished
from depictions, and as something provided to be followed. Accord-
ing to Reitenour, Warner Books published and distributed 115,000
copies of First Love in October of 1985.212 Shortly after, a librarian in
New Jersey pointed out that its "Natural Method" chapter stated that
the safe times to engage in sexual relations are "the week before and
207. The facts of United States v. McDavid, 37 MJ. 861 (1993), provide generalized
support for the argument that instructions go beyond mere description and deserve unique
analysis for the purposes of a Brandenburg incitement test. In McDavid, the accused was
convicted of violating an Air Force regulation by possessing drug abuse paraphernalia and
possession of LSD. See id. at 862. The United States Air Force Court of Military Review
affirmed the conviction, holding that written instructions for production of a controlled
substance could constitute "drug paraphernalia" within the meaning of the cited violation.
Id. at 863 (emphasis added).
208. Diamond & Primm, supra note 40, at 991 (emphasis added). See example cases,
such as Herceg and Olivia N., supra note 45.
209. Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 846. The Fourth Circuit, however, distinguished imitative or
copy-cat media cases from the Hit Man Manuals case before it:
it will presumably never be the case that the broadcaster or publisher actually
intends, through its description or depiction, to assist another or others in the
commission of violent crime; rather, the information for the dissemination of
which liability is sought to be imposed will actually have been misused vis-a-vis
the use intended, not, as here, used precisely as intended.
Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
210. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 840.
211. See Reitenour, supra note 47.
212. See id. at 71.
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the week of ovulation. '1 13 The chapter should have stated that these
are the unsafe times to engage in sexual relations. 14 Warner Books
recalled First Love in December of 1985, "presumably before the mis-
information caused any 'accidents.' "215 The recall reveals Warner
Books' assumption that purchasers of First Love would follow its tips,
explanations, and instructions, trusting them as proper, safe, and ad-
vantageous to follow. Given this rather unremarkable assumption by
a publisher, based in common understanding, it is difficult to defend
the district court in Rice, which was so quick to conclude that instruc-
tion manuals do not "incite." For even though
courts are generally reluctant to hold authors, publishers, or re-
tailers liable for injuries caused by printed media, they invaria-
bly make a distinction between publications that expressly invite
reliance and publications that are merely informational. Only
publications that reasonably invite reliance are potentially ac-
tionable. These publications generally include "how-to" books,
cookbooks, science textbooks, navigational charts, and "a lim-
ited [comparable] class of articles published in magazines or
newspapers. 2 1 6
Thus, even absent powerful language or a second-person impera-
tive style like that in Hit Man Manuals, there is a difference between
instruction and depiction-and a corresponding difference between
the concrete teaching of how-to and the abstract teaching of an idea,
opinion, or credo. The district court in Rice took no notice of these
differences and therefore did not consider the potentially empower-
ing, facilitating, and ultimately inciting effect of a published step-by-
step guide to murder. To ignore such differences, ignores "the flexibil-
ity of language, indeed of communication, and.., that the context can
determine the meaning. 2 1 7
Furthermore, to account for such differences and to make more
studied 'incitement' judgments under Brandenburg need not chill the
free flow of information. Steve Reitenour has suggested simple steps
by which all members in the "media chain" -authors, publishers, and
retailers-can currently reduce their chances, however small, of being




216. Id. at 73 (citations omitted).
217. Crump, supra note 39, at 18. See also Radwan, supra note 79 at 66 ("The Rice
court's casual dismissal of the potential advocacy simply because the manuals lack an ex-
plicit statement encouraging readers to 'Go out and kill someone!' ignores the potential for
subtly steering someone to commit the crime." (citations omitted)).
218. See Reitenour, supra note 47, at 92-93.
which include obtaining sufficient insurance coverage, providing clear
disclaimers of accuracy, and providing warnings if the information
could cause injury,2 19 would enable potential defendants to "continue
providing their essential services of producing and disseminating in-
formation to consumers without fear of an increased likelihood of lia-
bility." 2 0 They would serve this same protective function no matter
how detailed a court's incitement determination.
IV. Conclusion
David Crump writes, "our courts should take the potential for
tragedy seriously; they should strive to make the best accommodation
possible between these competing values, rather than cavalierly writ-
ing off the victims of camouflaged incitement."22' For while freedom
of speech is obviously a fundamental value, there are important
"countervailing interests, including murder victims' right to bodily se-
curity."222 Even the United States Supreme Court has specifically
"rejected the notion that the First Amendment interest in protected
speech requires that 'publishers and broadcasters enjoy an uncondi-
tional and indefeasible immunity from [tort] liability."' 2  Indeed,
"[d]espite the grand flourishes of rhetoric in many [F]irst
[A]mendment decisions concerning the sanctity of 'dangerous' ideas,
no federal court has held that death is a legitimate price to pay for
freedom of speech."224
The very existence of categories of speech, such as child pornog-
raphy, defamation, or fighting words, which are excepted from First
Amendment protection, represents an accommodation of competing
values. In the Supreme Court's own time-tested words, certain classes
of speech are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
219. See id. Use of warnings should be encouraged in any event because they are inex-
pensive and helpful in preventing injuries or accidents.
220. Id. at 93.
221. Crump, supra note 39, at 13-14.
222. Id. at 21.
223. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1119 n.8 (11th Cir.
1992) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)).
224. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J.,
concurring in the judgment and dissenting in relevant part), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959
(1988).
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derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality."2'
The district court in Rice "cavalierly" wrote off the victims of the
Hit Man Manuals' deadly information by employing an inadequate
incitement analysis. It failed to even consider the extent to which con-
text governs the meaning of language and the corresponding extent to
which instructions could conceivably, uniquely constitute incitement
under Brandenburg. According to the Fourth Circuit, the district
court must have misunderstood the "inartful[ ]" Brandenburg decision
as protecting abstract advocacy of lawlessness as well as "the teaching
of the technical methods of criminal activity. '226 Whatever the expla-
nation, at the heart of the district court's unexamined ruling in favor
of Paladin, is an incitement standard that needs reworking.
A more reality-based, contextual characterization of incitement,
would force careful examination of the speech at issue, would poten-
tially envelope violent crime instruction manuals like the Hit Man
Manuals in Rice, and would better account for countervailing inter-
ests, including the "social interest in order" and the instruction manu-
als' unique propensity to cause serious harm.227 Further, a contextual
characterization could accomplish these goals without threatening the
First Amendment's capacity to "foster[ ] a free flow exchange of infor-
mation in the open marketplace of ideas."228 Such a characterization
of incitement, although perhaps imperfect, would help prevent super-
ficial judicial treatment like that undertaken by the district court in
Rice.
225. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). See also Diamond &
Primm, supra note 40, at 970-71 ("Supreme Court decisions have acknowledged that some
speech is inherently less worthy of protection than other speech.").
226. Rice, 128 F.3d at 250, 263.
227. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
228. Tatro, supra note 50, at 968(citation omitted).
